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to have limited the exposition to the statement of his general meaning.

There is one part of this section of the work (C. XI pt. ii), which is however of great interest. It occurs partly as a digression, and deals with the relation of Hutcheson to Adam Smith's Economics. The exposition here is so complete and careful that it seems to leave nothing further to be said on the subject.

In the last division of his work (the position of Hutcheson in the History of Thought), Dr. Scott is much more successful than in the preceding. The chapter on "Hellenic and Philanthropic Ideals" (c. VIII) might have been made shorter and more concentrated, but is suggestively written. "Puritanism" is used very loosely, and the supposition that puritanism was historically or is in principle inconsistent with the Greek Spirit seems quite erroneous. How will Dr. Scott reconcile his position with the life and work of such a typical Puritan as Milton, or even with Oliver Cromwell's interest in art (p. 151)? We would call attention to the interesting chapter (XIII) on Hutcheson's influence on the Scottish Aufklärung, and more especially to the last chapter, XIV, where Dr. Scott traces (by the way he says, of a "digression") the origin of the principle, "The greatest happiness of the greatest number." This is admirably done, and is one of the best things in the book.

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THE LIFE, UNPUBLISHED LETTERS, AND PHILOSOPHICAL REGIMEN OF ANTHONY, THIRD EARL OF SHAFTESBURY. Edited by Benjamin Rand, Ph. D., Harvard University. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1900. Pp. xxxi., 535.

This interesting volume was published almost simultaneously with Mr. Robertson's edition of the "Characteristics." It consists of two parts, the unpublished letters and the philosophical regimen. Prefixed are a short introduction by Dr. Rand and a sketch of Shaftesbury's life by his son, the fourth Earl. As Dr. Rand points out in his very brief but excellent introduction, this life of Shaftesbury was printed in its essentials by Thomas Birch in Boyle's General Dictionary. The letters in this volume, with some exceptions, and the philosophical regimen, both appear in print for the first time. The letters extend over a considerable period of

time, from 1689 to 1713, and are arranged in chronological order. Some of them deal with personal and family matters; some with political affairs; and a few have a philosophical interest. Of these last the most important perhaps is one, dated November 9, 1709, and addressed to General Stanhope. In it Shaftesbury gives his opinion of Locke's philosophy. The dispute about innate principles is, according to Shaftesbury, "one of the childishest disputes that ever was. Well it is for our friend, Mr. Locke, and other modern philosophers of his sire, that they have so poor a spectre as the ghost of Aristotle to fight with" (p. 414). He goes on to declare that it is "the poor secondary tralatitious system which is the subject of their continual triumph" (*ibi*). Shaftesbury maintains that the real question is not "whether the very philosophical propositions about right and wrong were innate; but whether the passion or affection towards society was such: that is to say, whether it was natural and came of itself, or was taught by art, and was the product of a lucky hit of some first man who inspired and delivered down the prejudice" (p. 415). His view of Locke as a philosopher is, in this letter, not very high. He thinks him inconsistent, an "ill-builder," and "little able to treat the home points of philosophy." The two philosophers were however on excellent personal terms, as one may judge from Shaftesbury's numerous letters to Locke, with whom, as he says, "I ever concealed my differences as much as possible" (p. 416). As to the other miscellaneous letters, it is for the purposes of this journal only needful to say that they reveal a remarkably benevolent disposition on Shaftesbury's part to assist young men. He is a worthy predecessor of the philanthropic seventh Earl.

It is the Philosophical Regimen that one is here chiefly concerned with. It is a series of reflections on various philosophical subjects, such as natural affections, Deity, good and ill, human affairs, self, passions, pleasure and pain, fancy, character, nature, life, and philosophy. These were written at various times during a period extending over fourteen years. They were not intended by the author for publication (p. 242). Hence they lack a finish and completeness which belongs only to works definitely written for the public. It is also probably owing to the same cause that the style is interrogative, questioning. Such a manner of writing palls upon one, and seems alien to an Englishman. It is, however, relieved by many eloquent passages. Instance that on Deity (p. 36) in praise of the man whose faith in Providence does not de-

pend on historical tradition, and who leaves the future to take care of itself, satisfied that all things are for the best.

The reflections are called by Shaftesbury *Ασκήματα* (exercises). They embody his attempt to lay down for himself correct rules of life. But they cannot be said to throw much fresh light upon his well-known ethical theory. They exhibit throughout the strongest marks of the influence which the Stoical writings, especially those of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, had upon Shaftesbury, who quotes largely from them and even reproduces their technical language. Philosophy is for him essentially practical. "The work of philosophy is to fortify a mind, to learn how to be secure against avarice, ambition, intemperance; how to throw off cowardice and effeminacy; how to cure disquiet, restlessness, anxiety, and to find that which may satisfy and content us, since riches, honors, etc., neither can, nor if they could, are such as to be counted on as durable or certain" (pp. 269-270). He has little interest in pure speculation about ideas, their agreement or disagreement, etc. (p. 268). To the present-day reader, who is accustomed to a close conjunction of ethics with metaphysics, such indifference will appear strange; nor will it bear too close an examination.

Such being Shaftesbury's conception of philosophy, one naturally asks in what the good of man consists. The answer is in brief a cheerful Stoicism. "What is really my good, Providence has placed within my power to obtain; what is ill, to avoid" (p. 43). Man's good is in a certain temper and disposition, in a certain mind and will. His ideal is to have "a generous affection, an exercise of friendship, a constant kindness and benignity of disposition, a constant complacency, constant security, tranquility, equanimity" (pp. 54-5). This equanimity of mind is attained by recognizing, and acquiescing in the order of things. Like the Stoics, Shaftesbury enlarges upon law and order in nature. Our end is "to act according to nature" (p. 52). But he does not, any more than the Stoics, seem to reconcile effectively (1) reverence for the established order of nature, as the manifestation of a Universal Mind, with (2) indifference to all the objects of worldly desire. Indeed he carries at times (see his reflection on Human Affairs) this second element so far as almost to preach indifference to other men's characters. This would put an end to all moral reform. But in a man's notes for his own guidance, written at different times during a considerable period, and never revised as a whole,

one must not press such objections too severely. The Philosophical Regimen is a remarkable presentation in English of Stoical principles, and, although more popular than strictly scientific in its treatment of the various topics it deals with, is well worth reading.

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EVOLUTION AND THEOLOGY, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By Otto Pfeleiderer. Edited by Orello Cone. London: A. and C. Black, 1900. Pp. 306.

In collecting the papers which compose this volume, "the editor has been actuated by a desire to place in a convenient form before English readers some of the occasional writings of one of the foremost theologians and scholars of this century." The volume will, no doubt, enable those who are unacquainted with Professor Pfeleiderer's larger works to form some idea of his theological views. But apart from this purpose the papers are so largely of a popular and occasional character as hardly to call for republication, especially when it is considered that the important works in which Professor Pfeleiderer's philosophical and theological views are fully and carefully stated have been already translated. Some four papers deal with the relations of theology and science, or the requirements which must be fulfilled by a scientific theology. In these Professor Pfeleiderer explains in a popular way the standpoint of the Rationalistic school of which he is a prominent representative. He would no doubt disclaim the epithet "rationalistic;" but it is perhaps the most convenient term to express, on the one hand, the transformation of Christian doctrine which is involved in the rejection of the supernatural, and, on the other, that subordination of theology to philosophy, in virtue of which the truth of religion is proved not from religious experience itself but by some process of metaphysical reasoning. Two papers are of a more specially theological character. That on "The Essence of Christianity" is perhaps the most valuable in the book; it gives a brief but very clear and comprehensive sketch of Christian theology from the Rationalistic point of view. The other discusses "Jesus' Foreknowledge of His Sufferings and Death." There are other papers on Luther, on "The National Traits of the Germans as Seen in their Religion" (in